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Effective Child Support Enforcement
In Kentucky: The Tax Refund
Intercept Program
The failure of absent parents to support their children is
a serious problem for millions of women and children in this
country. Default on the basic societal obligation of parents to
support minor children is cheating American children out of
nearly $4 billion a year. The Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Margaret Heckler, has termed this problem "a na-
tional disgrace. "
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Refund Intercept Program (TRIP)2 is a method of
collecting past-due child support from an absent parent by with-
holding any tax refund due that individual. Congress enacted
TRIP in 1981 to expand the existing Child Support Enforcement
Act3 and strengthen the role of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) in the continuing federal effort to assist states in collecting
' OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICEs, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 8TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, 84-0001 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORcEmmNr] (citing statement by Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, before the House Subcommittee on Public Assist-
ance and Unemployment Compensation, Committee on Ways and Means, Child Support
Enforcement Amendments, July 14, 1983).
2 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1984); I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1984). See notes 33-67 infra and
accompanying text (explaining statutory framework of TRIP). For purposes of this
Comment, the collection of past-due support pursuant to I.R.C. § 6402(c) and 42 U.S.C
§ 664 is referred to as the Tax Refund Intercept Program (TRIP). Courts and commen-
tators have sometimes used other names for the program, such as the Offset Program
or Tax Refund Offset Program.
42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1982). See note 5 infra.
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child support obligations. 4 Section 2331 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA)5 authorizes state child support agen-
cies to use TRIP to collect past due child support that has been
assigned to the state. In the past, TRIP was available only to
families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) benefits. 6 The 1984 Child Support Amendments ex-
tended TRIP to non-AFDC and foster care cases.7
TRIP has been a very effective method s of collecting delin-
quent child support in AFDC cases. Statistics show a continuing
4 See H.R. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 985 (1981) (amplifying collection
authority of the IRS as part of child support enforcement program general expansion).
See generally Note, In Support of Support: The Federal Tax Refund Offset Program,
37 TAx LAW. 719 (1983-84).
' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2331(a), 95
Stat. 357, 860 (1981) (adding Social Security Act § 464, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 664), &
§ 2331(c)(2), 95 Stat. 357, 861 (1981) (adding I.R.C. § 6402(c)) [hereinafter cited as
OBRA]. 42 U.S.C. § 664 became an amendment to the Child Support Enforcement Act,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Child Support Enforcement
Act].
6 The connection between the AFDC program and TRIP is not obvious from the
statutory provisions. See notes 38-67 infra and accompanying text.
1 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A)-(B) (1985) provides:
(2)(A) Upon receiving notice from a State agency administering a plan
approved under this part that a named individual owes past-due support
(as that term is defined for purposes of this paragraph under subsection
(c) of this section) which such state has agreed to collect under section
654(6) of this title, and that the State agency has sent notice to such
individual in accordance with paragraph (3)(A), the Secretary of the Treas-
ury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal Taxes
paid, are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual
filed a tax return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary
of the Treasury finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold
from such refunds an amount equal to such past-due support, and -shall
concurrently send notice to such individual that the withholding has been
made, including in or with such notice a notification to any other person
who may have filed a joint return with such individual of the steps which
such other person may take in order to secure his or her proper share of
the refund. The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay the amount withheld
to the State agency, and the State shall pay to the Secretary of the Treasury
any fee imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to cover the costs of the
withholding and any required notifications. The State agency shall, subject
to paragraph (3)(B), distribute such amount to or on behalf of the child
to whom the support was owed.
(B) This paragraph shall apply only with respect to refunds payable under
section 6402 of title 26 after December 31, 1985, and before January 1,
1991. (emphasis added).
8 During 1983, the second year of operation, TRIP made impressive gains in the
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increase in both female-headed families9 and the proportion of
the poor who live in female-headed families.10 The serious prob-
lems encountered by these families in collecting their entitled
support" reinforces the compelling need to extend TRIP to non-
AFDC families as wellY2
number of cases processed and total amount of collections. For the 1983 tax processing
year, all fifty states and three jurisdictions (Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
submitted a total of 872,328 cases for potential intercept-a fifty-five percent increase
over the number of cases submitted in 1982. As of September 30, 1983, intercepts had
been made in 328,678 cases, about thirty percent of the cases submitted. Collections
totalled $172.3 million, an increase of about $4 million over 1982. With additional
processing still to occur after these figures were reported, intercepts were made in 50,000
more cases than in 1982. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
" U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83,
Table 73 (unpublished data from the March, 1982, Current Population Survey). Adapted
from House of Representatives, Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families,
U.S. Children and Their Families: Current Conditions and Recent Trends, at 6. This
bulletin provides the following tabulation:
Number of Families With Children Under 18 (in millions)
1960 1970 1980 1982 1983
Total Families 26.66 28.81 30.52 31.01 30.82
Female-headed 1.89 2.93 5.34 5.87 5.72
Percent
Female-headed
Total Families 7 10 17 19 19
10 In Fiscal Year 1982, about 36% of all female-headed families were poor,
compared with 7.5% of married-couple families. Female-headed families with four or
more children had a poverty rate of 78.50, compared to a rate of 36.2%o for all families
with four or more children. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Current Population Reports,
Series P-60, No. 144, Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1982,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984 (selected tables).
1 In the spring of 1982, there were 8.4 million women with at least one child
under the age of twenty-one whose father was not present in the household. Only about
five million of these women (59%) had been awarded child support payments. During
the previous year, four million were due to receive child support payments. Fewer than
two million (47%) received the full amount awarded. Of the remaining women some
received part of what was due; others received nothing at all. The aggregate amount of
child support due in 1981 amounted to $9.9 billion, but payments actually received
amounted to only about $6.1 billion. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF COMmeRCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, Child Support and Alimony, 1981, Current Population Reports Special Studies,
Series P-23, No. 124, at 1-2.
11 See SOCIL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALM AND HUmAN
SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Vol. 45, No. 4, at 3 (1982). 11.1 million AFDC
recipients in 3.8 million families received more than $1.1 billion in monthly payments
for September, 1981. The number of families receiving AFDC benefits has increased
dramatically in recent years, doubling between 1959 and 1969, and doubling again by
1977. Failure to pay child support shifts the burden of supporting the AFDC program
to taxpayers. Id. at 7.
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The Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) admin-
isters TRIP' 3 pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, 14 and
has collected more than $7.8 million since the inception of the
program in the 1981 tax year. 5 On April 19, 1985, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, in Cabinet for Human Resources v. Horn,'6
ruled that the CHR was meeting "few, if any of the due process
requirements when it seeks to intercept an individual's property
in the form of a refund of taxes paid. ' 17 The court also said
that the CHR must provide for a predeprivation hearing to
comply with due process requirements.' 8 The Kentucky Supreme
Court denied discretionary review on June 26, 1985, and ordered
the court of appeals opinion not to be published.' 9
It is significant, however, that in 1986 the CHR is changing
the administration of TRIP20 to comply with both the due proc-
ess requirements enunciated in Horn2' and the new amendments
11 904 Ky. ADMiN. REGs. 2:020 (1984) [hereinafter cited as KAR].
'4 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 205.710-.800, 205.992 (Baldwin 1974) [hereinafter cited
as KRS].
" Interview with Joseph Brown, supervisor of the Intercept Projects Section,
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources, in Frankfort, Kentucky (Aug. 16, 1985) [here-
inafter cited as Interview with J. Brown]. The following statistics were given for TRIP
in Kentucky:
TAX CASES AMOUNT HITS * AMOUNT
YEAR CERTIFIED CERTIFIED RECEIVED RECEIVED
1981 7,338 $14,578,825 4,085 $2,170,614
1982 4,307 $10,800,942 2,250 $1,169,106
1983 9,738 $18,121,065 4,760 $2,088,877
1984 **
federal 12,653 $30 million+ 5,061 $2,272,396
state 12,653 $30 million + 2,535 $195,000
• Hits refers to the number of intercepts, not cases.
•* Figures for 1984 as of August 16, 1984. TRIP was used to intercept state tax refunds
for the first time in the 1984 tax year.
16 32 Ky. L. Suii. 6, at 11 (Ky. Ct. App. May 3, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
KLS].
, Id. at 12.
1S Id.
19 Cabinet for Human Resources v. Horn, 32 KLS 6, at 11. Because of this order,
Horn cannot be cited as authority in Kentucky courts. See Ky. R. Crv. P. 76.28(c)
(1985). See generally Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145 (1984-85).
'0 Interview with J. Brown, supra note 15. Brown, the supervisor of the Intercept's
Projects Section, indicated that plans for predeprivation notice and hearing are being
made by his office but that specific details are not yet available.
21 See 32 KLS 6, at 12.
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to the federal TRIP statutes. 22 These changes include sending a
predeprivation notice to the obligated taxpayer that details pro-
cedures for a predeprivation administrative hearing. The effect
of these added procedures-increased administrative costs24-will
be amplified by the extension of TRIP to non-AFDC families
during the 1986 tax year.21 The expansion of the program to
intercept both state and federal tax refunds, which began with
the 1984 tax year, has also increased administrative costs and
procedures .26
Although TRIP has been characterized by its administrators
as a highly successful program, 27 the program has been plagued
by challenges to both the scope and the constitutionality of its
collection procedures. 2 Kentucky courts may soon be faced with
challenges to TRIP that have been addressed by federal and
other state courts. 29 This Comment explains the complicated
statutory framework of TRIP,30 surveys the major issues raised
by both taxpayer challenges and governmental defenses, 31 and
2 See notes 83-85, 141-51 infra and accompanying text.
2 See notes 145-47 infra and accompanying text.
24 Interview with J. Brown, supra note 15 (indicating that additional notice and
hearing requirements would increase costs).
KRS § 205.721 (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides:
(1) All services available to individuals receiving aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC) benefits shall also be available to individuals
not receiving AFDC benefits, upon application by such individuals with
the cabinet.
(2) The cabinet is authorized to charge an application fee for such services
based on a fee schedule, which shall take into account at least the following
factors about the individual:
(a) Locality of residence;
(b) Family size;
(c) Gross income; and
(d) Liquid assets. The cabinet shall endeavor to recover these fees
from the non-supporting parent and shall, if recovery is successful,
reimburse these fees to the applicant. (emphasis added).
z 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1984). The federal statute authorizes the interception of state
tax refunds to satisfy child support obligations. The Kentucky state tax intercept statute
does not specifically mention child support obligations. See KRS § 44.030 (1980).
2 See note 9 supra (statistics of TRIP).
z' See notes 68-140 infra and accompanying text (jurisdictional and due process
challenges to TRIP).
- See notes 74-102 infra and accompanying text (taxpayer challenges to TRIP).
30 See notes 33-67 infra and accompanying text.
31 See notes 68-146 infra and accompanying text.
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suggests administrative procedures to effectuate the smooth im-
plementation and expansion of TRIP in Kentucky. 32
I. STATUTORY FRAmEwomI
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 established
TRIP. 33 OBRA authorizes the United States Treasury Depart-
ment to intercept federal income tax overpayments that are owed
to child support obligors and transfer the refunds, to the extent
of the taxpayer's past-due support obligations, to the state. Two
provisions of OBRA are relevant to TRIP. The first provision
is 42 U.S.C. section 664(2)(A),3 4 an amendment to the Social
Security Act authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to with-
hold "refunds of Federal taxes paid" that are owed to a parent
of children supported by AFDC. The amendment permits the
Secretary to transfer these funds to the state agency administer-
ing TRIP to satisfy the parent's child support obligations. The
second relevant provision is I.R.C. section 6402(c), 36 an amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code implementing the procedure
that 42 U.S.C. section 664(a)(1) authorizes. I.R.C. Section 6402(c)
provides that "[tihe amount of any overpayment to be refunded
to the person making the overpayment" shall be reduced by the
amount of any past-due child support. 37
32 See notes 147-60 infra and acompanying text.
13 OBRA §§ 2331(a) & (c)(2) (1981). See note 5 supra.
- 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A) (1985). See note 7 supra (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A)).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A).
36 I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1984) provides:
(C) OFFSET OF PAST-DUE SUPPORT AGAINST OVERPAYmENTS. The amount of
any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment
shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support (as defined in
section 464(c) of the Social Security Act) owed by that person of which
the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with Section 464
of the Social Security Act. The Secretary shall remit the amount by which
the overpayment is so reduced to the State to which such support has been
assigned and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of
the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due
support has been paid to the State. This subsection shall be applied to an
overpayment prior to its being credited to a person's future liability for an
internal revenue tax.
37 Id.
[Vol. 74
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A. The Full Collection Method
Many of the procedural issues involved in cases challenging
TRIP have resulted from confusion between TRIP (the "inter-
cept" method), implemented by I.R.C. section 6402(c), and the
"full collection" method implemented by I.R.C. section 6305(a).38
States collecting support obligations under either section must
have an approved enforcement plan in effect. 39 In addition,
states must demonstrate to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) that they have made reasonable efforts to collect
the support through state enforcement mechanisms. 40 The two
collection methods may be used either separately or conjunc-
tively.41 An understanding of the differences between the two
methods is essential to an evaluation of the legal challenges to
TRIP.
-s I.R.C. § 6305(a) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL. Upon receiving a certification from the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services],
under Section 452(b) of the Social Security Act with respect to any indi-
vidual, the Secretary shall assess and collect the amount certified by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services], in the same manner, with the same powers, and (except
as provided in this section) subject to the same limitations as if such
amount were a tax imposed by subtitle C the collection of which would be
jeopardized by delay, except that-
(1) no interest or penalties shall be assessed or collected,
(2) for such purposes, paragraphs (4), (6), and (8) of section 6334(a)
(relating to property exempt from levy) shall not apply,
(3) there shall be exempt from levy so much of the salary, wages, or
other income of an individual as is being withheld therefrom in gar-
nishment pursuant to a judgment entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction for the support of his minor children, and -
(4) in the case of the first assessment against an individual for delinquen-
cy under a court order against such individual for a particular person or
persons, the collection shall be stayed for a period of 60 days immediate-
ly following notice and demand as described in section 6303.
See also notes 39-47 infra and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between I.R.C.
§§ 6305(a) and 6402(c)).
11 See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 1984
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 9.
- 45 C.F.R. §§ 303.71(c)(4) (1984) (full collection) & 303.72(b)(1) (1984) (tax
refund intercept).
41 47 Fed. Reg. 5714 (1982) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.6305-1(b)(4)(iii)).
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The full collection method, enacted in 1975,42 authorizes the
IRS to collect delinquent support obligations by a variety of
methods,43 including garnishment, attachment and sale of prop-
erty, and offset of the delinquent parent's federal tax refund.4
Any family may use the full collection method, including those
not receiving AFDC benefits.4 5 The family must have either a
court or an administrative order for support, 46 and the amount
owed must be at least $750 in arrears.47 States proceeding under
this method are required to show that they have made reasonable
efforts to collect the past-due support. 48
B. TRIP (The Intercept Method)
TRIP (the "intercept" method),49 on the other hand, requires
states to show only that they have made reasonable efforts to
collect the past-due support.5 In contrast to the full collection
method, the sole collection method authorized by TRIP is the
interception of tax refunds.5 1 Prior to 1986, TRIP was available
only to families receiving AFDC benefits 5 2 but is now available
to any family with a court order for support.5 3
As an eligibility condition for AFDC benefits, AFDC appli-
cants must assign their support rights to the state.5 4 The support
42 Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337,
2358 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-65) (1975).
43 I.R.C. § 6305(a)(1)-(4).
- 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.60 & 302.65 (1984).
4 Id. § 303.71(b).
4 Id. § 303.71(c)(1).
4 Id. § 303.71(c)(2).
41 To proceed under I.R.C. § 6305, the states must describe the collection actions
already taken, why such actions failed and why further state action would be unpro-
ductive. 45 C.F.R. § 303.71(e)(4)(i)-(ii). In addition, the state must establish that the
delinquent parent possesses assets. Id. § 303.71(e)(7)(1).
41 I.R.C. § 6402(c). See note 36 supra (quoting I.R.C. § 6402(c)).
45 C.F.R. § 303.72(b)(1).
11 I.R.C. § 6402(c). See note 36 supra (quoting I.R.C. § 6402(c)).
12 49 Fed. Reg. 36,788 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 303.72).
13 I.R.C. § 6402(c).
14 42 U.S.C. § 602(26)(A) provides in part:
[E]ach applicant or recipient will be required ... (A) to assign the State
any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i)
in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the
applicant is applying for or receiving aid and (ii) which have accrued at
the time such assignment is executed.
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obligation then becomes a debt owed by the delinquent parent
to the state.5 TRIP enables a state to receive the tax overpay-
ment of any person owing child support to the state directly
from the IRS . 6 The state welfare agency reports to the Secretary
of HHS the name of any noncustodial parent who is more than
$150 in arrears.5 7 The Secretary, through the Office of Child
Support Enforcement, then ascertains whether a valid support
order exists and whether the noncustodial parent is in default. 8
If the determination is positive, the Secretary of HHS certifies
the parent's name to the Secretary of the Treasury,59 who directs
the IRS to withhold an amount of the delinquent parent's federal
tax refund sufficient to satisfy the parent's debtA0 Tax overpay-
ments may be used to satisfy past-due support obligations only
after any federal income tax arrearages have been completely
satisfied. 6 1
In January, 1986, TRIP became available to any family owed
past-due child support. 62 State child support agencies must sub-
mit to the IRS the names of absent parents who owe past-due
support and against whom the withholding procedures may be ap-
plied .6  These non-AFDC claims must be limited to cases in
which: (1) there are arrearages of $500 or more, 4 and (2) current
payment patterns and the state agency's enforcement efforts
indicate that payment of arrearages is unlikely before the offset
occurs. 65 In addition, states may limit arrearages submitted to
the IRS to amounts that have accrued since the state undertook
" Id. § 656(a).
!6 Id.
- 42 C.F.R. § 303.72(b)(2).
" Id. § 303.72(d)(1). The regulations require the state agency to submit notification
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) by October of each year. Id. §
303.72(c). HHS must transmit the request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by
December 1 of the same year. Id. § 303.72(d)(2).
5 Id. § 303.72(d)(2).
I.R.C. § 6402(c). See note 36 supra (quoting I.R.C. § 6402(c)).
11 Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-5(d)(1) (1975). If any amount of the intercepted refund
remains after being applied against outstanding tax liability and past-due support, the
amount remaining may be credited to the taxpayer's future tax liability. Id.
49 Fed. Reg. 36,788 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(a)(3)(i)-(iv)).
- 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(b)(l)-(3).
- Id. § 303.72(a)(3)(ii).
- Id. § 303.72(a)(4)-(5).
1985-86]
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support collection for the non-AFDC family.66 The Secretary of
HHS' verification process is the same for both non-AFDC fam-
ilies and AFDC cases. 67
II. TAXPAYER CHALLENGES AND GOVER N ENT DEFENSES
Taxpayers have challenged TRIP on a number of grounds.
The most significant challenges have focused on inadequate no-
tice and hearing procedures used in the administration of the
program. 6 Federal and state government defendants have as-
serted that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
such actions.69 Both the IRS and the states have also objected
that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,70 the Anti-In-
junction Act, 71 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,72 courts do
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate these actions.73
A. Taxpayer Challenges
1. Due Process
Taxpayers have challenged the procedures and scope of TRIP
on several substantive grounds. The most significant challenge
is that TRIP violates the fifth74 and fourteenth75 amendment due
process requirements by failing to provide adequate notice and
hearing before depriving taxpayers of their property. 76 Prior to
- Id. § 303.72(a)(3)(iii).
- 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(d)(2).
m' See notes 74-91 infra and accompanying text (due process challenges to TRIP).
69 See notes 119-27 infra and accompanying text (jurisdictional issues in suits
challenging TRIP).
70 See notes 103-0S infra and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity
claims).
11 See notes 109-18 infra and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional prohibi-
tions in Anti-Injunction Act).
7See notes 109-18 infra and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional prohibi-
tions in Declaratory Judgment Act).
71 See notes 103-18 infra and accompanying text.
74 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71 Id. amend. XIV.
76 E.g., Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D.R.I. 1983) (plaintiffs contend
implementation of the intercept program was accomplished without procedural safe-
guards, depriving them of due process); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101, 1105-06
(D. Conn. 1983) (due process challenge to the adequacy of procedures).
[Vol. 74
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the new amendments, federal regulations governing the admin-
istration of TRIP 77 simply required that taxpayers receive ad-
vance written notice that their past-due support obligation had
been referred to the IRS for collection, 78 and that the proper
state agency investigate complaints concerning erroneous off-
sets. 79 The complaint procedure could be used only after the
intercept had occurred. 0 Federal and state program administra-
tion has generally failed to provide taxpayers with a predepri-
vation notice informing them of their right to challenge TRIP.8'
In evaluating the deprivation aspects of TRIP, courts have
applied the United States Supreme Court's three-pronged bal-
ancing test used in the seminal notice case, Mathews v. Eld-
ridge.82 The Mathews test balances the risk of an erroneous
deprivation under current procedures against the potential re-
duction in deprivation that additional procedural safeguards
would provide. Furthermore, the test considers both the govern-
mental interest in regulating the subject matter and the admin-
istrative burden that additional safeguards would entail. 83 Courts
" See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text (discussing regulations for imple-
menting TRIP).
Is 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(f)(1). Under the regulations, the state agency may elect to
provide the notice; otherwise, the Office of Child Support Enforcement notifies the
taxpayer of the certification to the IRS. Id. The Office of Child Support Enforcement's
notice refers taxpayers to the appropriate state agency "if [the taxpayers] have any
questions, want to report an error, or want to pay past-due support to avoid offset of
their tax refund." 48 Fed. Reg. 2534, 2535 (1983) (explaining final regulation codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(f)(1)).
7? 45 C.F.R. § 303.72(g) (complaint procedure).
11 Id. § 303.72(g)(1) (discussing complaint regarding refund that "has been off-
set").
' Id. § 303.72(g)(1)-3) (providing mechanism for correcting errors only after offset
made). See Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 729, 738 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (taxpayer entitled under state law to challenge the administrative determination
that support is owed), aff'd, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
3475 (1985). But see 560 F. Supp. at 1109 (state began offering administrative review of
proposed offset in response to complaints).
424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Supreme Court considered whether due
process required the Social Security Administration to hold evidentiary hearings before
terminating disability benefits. Id. at 323. The Court found that an evidentiary hearing
was not required and that the available administrative procedures comported fully with
due process. Id. at 349. The procedure in Mathews included a process for asserting a
claim prior to administrative action, a right to a hearing, and a right to judicial review.
Id.
" 424 U.S. at 335.
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have generally held that, under the Mathews analysis, TRIP
violates taxpayers' due process rights.84
Finding a great risk of erroneous deprivation under TRIP,
the district court in McClelland v. Massingas5 noted that prede-
privation notice and hearing would not impose either great ad-
ministrative or financial burdens upon the states.8 6 The
McClelland court, relying upon the reasoning of two similar
cases,87 concluded that "[d]ue process requires a fair notice of
the possibility of interception and an opportunity to contest that
interception before it occurs. "18
A recent amendment to TRIP8 9 that took effect on December
31, 1985, requires the state to send delinquent parents notice of
impending intercepts before their names are certified to the
Secretary of the Treasury.90 Procedures to inform nonobligated
taxpayers (e.g., persons who have filed jointly with obligated
taxpayers) of their right to file an amended return requesting
their portion of the refund are outlined in other new amend-
ments.9' Proper administration of these new procedures should
prevent erroneous deprivation and many of the due process
" See, e.g., McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558, 566 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd,
786 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1986) (change in notice procedure would be burden on the state
but would improve greatly due process notice requirements); 574 F. Supp. at 598 (risk of
harm to plaintiff's interests could be lessened greatly by an easily implemented state action
such as a hearing); 560 F. Supp. at 1111 (to adequately protect due process rights, state
must provide predeprivation administrative review, not a full-blovn hearing).
600 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984).
Id. at 567.
See 574 F. Supp. at 598; 560 F. Supp. at 1111.
600 F. Supp. at 568.
89 42 U.S.C. § 664(3)(A) provides:
(3)(A) Prior to notifying the Secretary of the Treasury under paragraph
(I) or (2) that an individual owes past-due support, the State shall send
notice to such individual that a withholding will be made from any refund
otherwise payable to such individual. The notice shall also (i) instruct the
individual owing the past-due support of the steps which may be taken to
contest the State's determination that past-due support is owed or the
amount of the past-due support, and (ii) provide information, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to proce-
dures to be followed, in the case of a joint return, to protect the share of
the refund which may be payable to another person.
90 Id.
9, Id. § 664(a)(I)(3)(B)-(D).
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challenges raised in TRIP cases prior to the new amendments.
2. Earned Income Credit
Perhaps the major unresolved policy issue concerning TRIP
is whether earned income credit (EIC) can be intercepted. 92 EIC
is available as a credit against income tax to a low income parent
with a dependent child living in the same household. 93 In Rucker
v. Secretary of Treasury,94 the court, reasoning that TRIP au-
thorizes withholding only of federal taxes paid, held that EIC
cannot be intercepted. 95
The Ninth Circuit, in Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury,96
reached a different conclusion. 97 The Sorenson court found that
EIC can be intercepted because there was nothing in the legis-
lative history to indicate that Congress intended to treat EIC
differently than other funds classified as overpayments and paid
as a tax refund.98 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Sorenson to resolve this issue. 99 The Court must decide whether
the term "overpayment" as defined in I.R.C. section 6401,'00
which includes EIC, should be given the same definition under
I.R.C. section 6402(c) for TRIP purposes or should be narrowed
to include only the amount of taxes actually paid.'0' Balancing
the purposes of EIC against the importance of child support will
make this issue a close question. 10 2 The Court must decide be-
tween the competing interests of the low-income taxpayer earning
EIC and the low-income family seeking child support payments.
Given the strong congressional support for child support enforce-
- See I.R.C. § 32 (1985) (definition of earned income credit). See, e.g., 752 F.2d
at 1440-44.
See I.R.C. § 32(c)(1) (eligible individual defined).
751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
751 F.2d at 357.
752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1985), certgranted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985). EDITOR'S NOTE:
As this Comment was going to print, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit and found that excess earned income credits were overpayments and subject to the
intercept provisions. 106 S. Ct. 1600 (1986).
752 F.2d at 1444.
SId.
See 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
I.R.C. § 6401(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing that earned income credit is
included in the term overpayment).
01' See Nelson v. Regan, 731 F.2d 105, 110-12, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (2d
Cir. 1984) (discussing issues involved in intercepting EIC).
1 See id.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAv Jour.NAL
ment, as shown by the 1984 amendments, the Court should
affirm the Sorenson court and allow the interception of EIC.
B. Government Defenses
1. Sovereign Immunity
As sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless
Congress explicitly waives immunity. 0 3 District courts have dis-
missed the sovereign immunity defense in TRIP cases, recogniz-
ing that government officials can be sued without an express
congressional waiver when the complaint alleges that government
officials have violated constitutional authority04 and when the
statute conferring power upon the official is claimed to be un-
constitutional. 305
In Jahn v. Regan,10 for example, the Court allowed an
action against the Secretary of the Treasury and enjoined pro-
spective administration of the intercept program.107 The Court
refused the plaintiff's demand for monetary relief, however,
holding that there must be an express congressional waiver to
create jurisdiction over an action claiming money damages against
federal officials. 0 3 The doctrine of sovereign immunity, there-
fore, does not bar a taxpayer action for injunctive relief pro-
hibiting future implementation of TRIP, but does prohibit suits
against government officials for damages for refunds already
intercepted.
2. The Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act
The government also has argued that the procedural limits
of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act
11 E.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981); United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
,o' E.g., Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101, 1104, aff'd, 731 F.2d 105, cert.
denied sub nom., Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984) (sovereign immunity does
not bar suit in which, as here, plaintiffs claim agents of the government have exceeded
constitutional authority); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586, 595 (Plaintiffs argue that
intercept program abrogated their constitutional rights, and that, therefore, the defendant
is not shielded by sovereign immunity).
20 See Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 406-07 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
106 Id.
10 Id. at 406-07.
' Id.
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preclude taxpayer challenges to TRIP.' 9 The Anti-Injunction
Act prohibits suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax,"'10 while the Declaratory Judgment Act
expressly denies federal courts the power to grant declaratory
relief "with respect to federal taxes.""' Courts have generally
rejected the characterization of TRIP cases as "tax cases,"
holding inapplicable the jurisdictional limitations of both the
Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 112
Most courts facing this issue have found that the federal
government's compelling interest in initially collecting and as-
sessing taxes Without judicial interference is not present with
respect to tax refunds."' In Marcello v. Regan,' 4 for example,
the district court found that neither of these acts "contemplate[s]
barring actions, such as this, where the litigation [does] not
threaten to deny anticipated tax revenues to the Government."s
In Vidra v. Egger,"6 however, the district court found that both
the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act bar
taxpayer challenges to the intercept program." 7 Since challenges
to TRIP occur after taxes have been assessed and collected, the
majority view that the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory
10 E.g., Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 557 F. Supp. at 732-33 (not a tax
refund suit, so the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act do not apply);
560 F. Supp. at 1103 (Declaratory Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act are designed
to protect the governmental need to collect taxes expeditiously and are thus inappropriate
for questions dealing with a tax refund); 574 F. Supp. at 594-95 (Declaratory Judgment
Act and Anti-Injunction Act deal with assessment and collection of taxes, not tax
refunds, and are thus inappropriate for questions dealing with a tax refund).
110 I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1984). The Anti-Injunction Act provides in pertinent part:
"[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall
be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed." Id.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1985).
"2 See, e.g., 557 F. Supp. at 732-33; 560 F. Supp. at 1103; Coughlin v. Regan,
584 F. Supp. 697, 705-06 (D. Me. 1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1985); 584 F.
Supp. at 407-08; 574 F. Supp. at 594-95. But see Vidra v. Egger, 575 F. Supp. 1305,
1307 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (taxpayer's challenges to intercept procedures in I.R.C. § 6402(c)
barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act).
"3 See 557 F. Supp. at 732; 560 F. Supp. at 1103; 584 F. Supp. at 705-06; 584 F.
Supp. at 407-08.
14 574 F. Supp. 586.
"I Id. at 595 (quoting Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on standing grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
16 575 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
W Id. at 1307-08.
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Judgment Act are inapplicable appears to be the correct ap-
proach."8
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Much of the litigation concerning the procedural aspects of
TRIP arises from confusing the intercept and full collection
methods." 9 Government defendants have contended that the ju-
risdictional provision of the full collection method, which states
that no federal court shall have jurisdiction over any action
"brought to restrain or review the assessment and collection of
amounts under subsection (a),"' 20 is applicable to the intercept
method as well.' 2' This jurisdictional provision precludes federal
jurisdiction to review or restrain assessment or to collect amounts
due under the full collection method. In the past there was no
such restriction on federal jurisdiction over TRIP suits brought
under the intercept method. '2Therefore, most courts held that
the jurisdictional limitations of the full collection method do not
bar a taxpayer's claim under the intercept method.'2
"I See, e.g., 560 F. Supp. at 1103.
119 See notes 34-67 supra and accompanying text (explaining the collection proce-
dures of I.R.C. §§ 6305(a) and 6402(c)).
,20 I.R.C. § 6305(b) imposes jurisdictional limitations on suits brought to challenge
the assessment and collection of past-due support by the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6305(a). See note 38 supra (quoting I.R.C. § 6305(a)). I.R.C. §
6305(b) provides:
(b) Review of assessments and collections. No court of the United States,
whether established under article I or article III of the Constitution, shall
have jurisdiction of any action, whether legal or equitable, brought to
restrain or review the assessment and collection of amounts by the Secretary
under subsection (a), nor shall any such assessment and collection be
subject to review by the Secretary in any proceeding. This subsection does
not preclude any legal, equitable, or administrative action against the State
by an individual in any State court or before any State agency to determine
his liability for any amount assessed against him and collected, or to recover
any such amount collected from him, under this section.
'21 See 557 F. Supp. at 733; 584 F. Supp. at 703-04; 574 F. Supp. at 592-93. See
also notes 34-67 supra and accompanying text (explaining collection procedures of I.R.C.
§§ 6305(a) and 6402(c)).
'2 See 584 F. Supp. at 703-05 (explaining why no jurisdictional restrictions apply
to I.R.C. § 6402(c)).
"2 See, e.g., 557 F. Supp. at 733; 584 F. Supp. at 703-05; 574 F. Supp. at 593.
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The 1984 amendments, however, have placed similar juris-
dictional limitations on suits challenging TRIP. 124 These severe
jurisdictional limitations on federal forums, 12 coupled with the
expansion of TRIP to non-AFDC families, 26 indicate that state
courts may soon be faced with a significant increase in the
number of cases challenging TRIP. 27
4. Eleventh Amendment
State defendants in TRIP suits have claimed that the eleventh
amendment 28 prevents taxpayers from seeking monetary relief
for tax refunds that have already been intercepted. 29 A sovereign
state or state agency cannot be sued for damages without its
consent when the suit seeks payments out of its treasury. 30
Therefore, taxpayer suits seeking only the return of tax refunds
- I.R.C. § 6402(e) (effective after Dec. 31, 1985 and before Jan. 1, 1988) provides:
(e) Review of reductions.-No court of the United States shall have juris-
diction to hear any action, whether legal or equitable, brought to restrain
or review a reduction authorized by subsection (c) or (d). No such reduction
shall be subject to review by the Secretary in an administrative proceeding.
No action brought against the United States to recover the amount of any
such reduction shall be considered to be a suit for refund of tax. This
subsection does not preclude any legal, equitable, or administrative action
against the Federal agency to which the amount of such reduction was
paid.
' See id.
' See note 7 supra (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A)-(B)) and accompanying text.
,r Jurisdictional limitations on federal courts will force taxpayers to assert claims
against TRIP in state courts. Compare In re Biddle, 31 Bankr. 449, 453 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1983), in which the court held that a federal court has jurisdiction to determine
whether the diversion of a debtor's income tax overpayments to the state to be applied
to the debtor's delinquent child support obligation constituted a preference pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1471(b). The court explained that I.R.C. § 6305(b) would force the debtor
to litigate these issues in state court but that 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) overrides the restriction
on federal jurisdiction in I.R.C. § 6305(b).
I" U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI provides: The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of a Foreign State.
', E.g., 731 F.2d at 110 (defendants claimed suit was for the return of refunds
and violates eleventh amendment immunity from suit for damages); Vidra v. Egger, 575
F. Supp. at 1308 (plaintiff's claims barred by the eleventh amendment to the extent that
repayment of refund withheld is sought).
I" Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676 (1974).
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that have been intercepted and transferred to the state treasury
are barred by the eleventh amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, in Edelman v. Jordan,3'
held that the eleventh amendment limits remedies against states
to prospective injunctive relief only, thereby prohibiting retro-
active awards from state treasuries.3 2 The Court, in Quern v.
Jordan,33 however, qualified its earlier holding by distinguishing
orders for money judgments from orders for notice and hearings
that might result in money judgments. 34 The Second Circuit, in
Nelson v. Regan,135 relied on Quern in affirming the district
court's decision ordering the commissioner of the Connecticut
Department of Human Resources to hold postd.eprivation hear-
ings that could result in retroactive awards of offsets.1 6
Other courts have declined to address the eleventh amend-
ment issue, finding that taxpayer plaintiffs were seeldng only
declaratory relief. 37 The eleventh amendment issue is now even
moje significant because a new amendment to the intercept
" 415 U.S. 651.
2 Id. at 677. In Edelman, the plaintiffs brought a class action for injunctive and
declaratory relief against Illinois officials responsible for administering the combined
federal and state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, then authorized
by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1964). 415 U.S. at 653. The plaintiffs
sought recovery of disability benefits for a period of eligibility overlooked by the states.
Id. at 655. The Court held that the eleventh amendment does not permit a suit that
seeks the award of an accrued monetary liability that must be paid from a state's general
revenues without consent or waiver by the state, and that the lower court's award of a
monetary judgment against the state was improper. See id. at 664-65 (distinguishing Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
"1 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
114 Id. at 346-49. The Court rejected the state's argument that the proposed notice
would lead to the payment of state funds for retroactive benefits and, therefore, in
effect, would amount to a monetary award. Id. at 347. According to the Court, the
"chain of causation" argued by the state was broken because the decision to award
retroactive benefits would rest entirely with the state. Id. at 348.
-1 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984).
1"6 731 F.2d at 110. The Second Circuit also noted that the state's incurring
administrative expense in providing the required notice and hearing does not result in
eleventh amendment violations. Id. (citing 440 U.S. at 347, and Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977)).
" See, e.g., 584 F. Supp. at 699 n.3 (The court was not required to rule on the
plaintiff's demand for injunctive relief, and did not address the eleventh amendment
issue.).
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statute prohibits suits against federal officials, 3 1 forcing taxpay-
ers challenging TRIP into state courts. States should avoid this
potential problem by following the newly mandated procedures
for predeprivation notice and hearing, 3 9 thereby preventing post-
intercept challenges. The preintercept notice should specify
methods for contesting the intercept within a specified time so
that any errors can be corrected before the tax refund is paid to
the state. 4° This will prevent state courts from having to give
retroactive monetary relief.
5. Other Defenses
Government defendants have tried to block challenges to the
intercept program by using a variety of other methods. These
include claims that taxpayer suits were moot, 4' that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the challenge, 42 that there was improper
service of process, 143 that the plaintiff failed to add necessary
parties,'4 and that litigation in federal court would duplicate
state proceedings. 45 Federal courts have generally ruled against
"I See note 118 supra (quoting I.R.C. § 6402(e)). This restriction forces taxpayers
to assert TRIP claims against state officials in state courts. See Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984) (Under the eleventh amendment, a
nonconsenting state is immune from suit in federal court.).
'" See notes 145-54 infra and accompanying text.
See 49 Fed. Reg. 36,790 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 303.72).
141 E.g., Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 555 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (D. Colo. 1983),
rev'd, 751 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1984) (claiming no case or controversy because
nonobligated taxpayer had received her share of the earned income credit); Presley v.
Regan, 604 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (due process claims moot because
statutory amendment required preintercept notices); McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F.
Supp. 558, 561 (D. Md. 1984) (asserting plaintiffs' claims are moot because they had
received their tax refund); 584 F. Supp. at 702 (contention that return of earned income
credit *to nonobligated spouse moots demands for declaratory and injunctive relief).
42 E.g., 600 F. Supp. at 562 (defendants claimed some plaintiffs lack standing
because they are not entitled to tax refunds even in the absence of the state intercept
program). Cf. Doitte v. Blum, 585 F. Supp. 887, 895-96 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (court raised
the issue of plaintiff's standing sua sponte).
" Cf. Swain v. Swain, 604 F. Supp. 181, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (state defendant
sought dismissal on grounds of improper service of process in an action involving the
I.R.C. § 6305 assessment method).
" See 600 F. Supp. at 564 (defendants claim that ex-spouses entitled to receive
child support payments are indispensable parties).
'" Id. The McClelland court rejected this claim by finding that no claims challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the state program were pending in state court.
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state and federal defendants asserting these defenses, finding
that constitutional challenges to TRIP are appropriate issues for
the federal forums. 146
III. EXPANDING AND IM1PLEMENTING CHANGES
TO TRIP IN KENTUCKY
Congress has reacted to many of the issues raised in taxpayer
challenges to TRIP by amending both the statutory provisions
and regulations of TRIP. 147 The new amendments mandate that
states provide preintercept notice to inform taxpayers of their
right to challenge the intercept and of potential defenses to the
intercept.' 48 While these new administrative procedures should
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, both the added
procedures 49 and the expansion of TRIP in 1986150 have signif-
icant implications for the administration of TRIP.
New federal laws mandate that the CHR send a preintercept
notice to the absent parent whose name will be submitted to the
IRS. '5 This notice must include the procedures for contesting
the proposed intercept 5 2 and inform the absent parent and his
or her spouse, if any, of the procedures available to protect the
portion of the refund belonging to the unobligated spouse.'53
Since the CHR is responsible for accurately submitting the amount
to be intercepted, 54 this agency must allow the absent parent to
furnish as much information as possible to avoid making incor-
rect submittals. A specified time period for contesting the inter-
cept action will ensure the correction of errors before amounts
,46 See, e.g., 555 F. Supp. at 1053 (taxpayer's claim not moot); 600 F. Supp. at
562 (plaintiffs injured by deprivation of refund have standing); 604 F. Supp. at 183
(issue of improper notice not decided).
147 See notes 7, 20-26 supra and accompanying text; notes 151-57 infra and accom-
panying text (discussing new amendments).
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 664(3)(A)-(D) (1985).
,49 See 42 U.S.C. § 664(2)(A)-(B); KRS § 205.71 (statutory authority for extension
of TRIP to non-AFDC families).
"I See Interview with J. Brown, supra note 15 (Additional notice and hearing
requirements would increase costs.).
-51 42 U.S.C. § 664(3)(A). See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
152 42 U.S.C. § 664(3)(A).
'' Id.
'- See 49 Fed. Reg. 36,790 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 303.72).
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are paid to the dependent families. 155 Following federal guidelines
should satisfy due process requirements outlined by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Horn'5 6 and significantly reduce potential
taxpayer actions in Kentucky state courts. The CHR also must
develop statewide information systems through the media and
local social service agencies to expand the scope of TRIP to
include all families meeting the necessary requirementsY.
5 7
The ultimate success of the program also depends upon
whether a parent whose tax refund is intercepted one year will
seek to avoid intercept the next year by increasing the number
of exemptions to decrease the amount withheld and subject to
intercept." 8 The IRS and state tax boards must closely scrutinize
returns to curtail such abuses. Limitations on federal court ju-
risdiction may also mean an increase in cases challenging TRIP
in state courts.5 9 Kentucky Courts must decide difficult issues
concerning the eleventh amendment, earned income credit and
taxpayer challenges to TRIP on other grounds.' 6°
CONCLUSION
The Tax Refund Intercept Program has proven an effective
method of collecting past-due child support for families receiving
AFDC benefits. The expansion of this program to include all
families will further the important federal policy of improving
child support enforcement. Even though revision of the admin-
istrative procedures for TRIP should reduce taxpayer challenges,
additional congressional clarification is needed to define the
scope of TRIP, particularly whether earned income credit can
'" Id.
J 32 KLS 6, at 11 (Ky. Ct. App. May 3, 1985). See notes 16-19 supra and
accompanying notes.
" ' See Interview with J. Brown, supra note 15 (no specific plans at this time for
publicizing TRIP to all families).
" See Note, supra note 4, at 740.
' See notes 118-21 supra and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional limits
of I.R.C. § 6402).
,1 See, e.g., Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 405 (E.D. Mich. 1984), rev'd, 53
U.S.L.W. 2632 (6th Cir. May 21, 1985) (claiming tax refund held as tenants by entirety);
Costello v. State, 185 Cal. Rptr. 582, 585 (Cal. App. 1982) (taxpayers claiming state
held tax refund as a trust). Courts should expect an increase in challenges to TRIP as
the program is extended to all families.
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be intercepted. The future success of TRIP depends upon con-
tinuing federal and state efforts to refine and revise implemen-
tation procedures.
Lynn C. Jones
